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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DMCA, THE ANTICIRCUMVENTION
RULEMAKING, AND THE INTERESTS INVOLVED
"

Tim Lee wanted to be able to watch DVDs on a computer
running Linux.'

" L. Peter Deutsch of Aladdin Enterprises needed to be able to use
fonts incorrectly copy protected by overprotective software.2
" Time Warner aimed to shield its intellectual property from the
effects of piracy by using technologies to protect against
unauthorized access of their copyrighted works.3
* Sony Computer Entertainment America sought, among other
things, to protect its ability to use technological means to
prevent the unauthorized distribution of PlayStation and
PlayStation 2 video games beyond their intended geographical
regions.4
These examples illustrate the diverse and adverse interests at stake in
any dispute over the boundaries of copyright. Generally speaking,
copyright owners seek to expand their stake in their intellectual property,
1. Comment from Tim Lee, Senior Software Design Engineer (Jan. 21, 2000), at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/comments/007.pdf (commenting on Copyright Office DMCA
proposed rulemaking).
2. Comment from L. Peter Deutch, President ofAladdin Enterprises, to the Copyright Office
(Jan. 21,2000), at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/comments/004.pdf (commenting on Copyright
Office DMCA proposed rulemaking).
3. Comment from Bernard R. Sorkin, to David 0. Carson, General Counsel of Copyright
GC/I&R (Feb. 7, 2000), at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/comments/043.pdf (commenting on
Copyright Office DMCA proposed rulemaking).
4. Comment from Riley R. Russell, Vice President, Legal & Business Affairs, Sony
Computer Entertainment America, Inc., to David 0. Carson (Feb. 17, 2000), http://www.
copyright.gov/1201/comments/190.pdf (commenting on Copyright Office DMCA proposed
rulemaking).

2007] THE FAILURES AND POSSIBLE REDEMPTION OF THE DMCA ANTICIRCUMVENTION RULEMAKING

335

and users of the copyright seek to reduce it.5 Since the enactment of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the conflict between these
interests is taking place in a new venue. In 2000, Lee, Deutsch, Time
Warner, and Sony took part in an unprecedented forum to establish the
legal framework that would set the balance between them.6 The new
forum, a rulemaking mandated by title 17, section 1201(a)(1)(C) of the
DMCA, presented a unique opportunity for interested parties to influence
the rules that would govern their ongoing struggle. 7
Section 1201(a) of the DMCA prohibits the circumvention of
"technological protection measure[s] that . . . control[] access" to
copyrighted works. 8 Technological protection measures (TPMs) can take
the form of scrambling, public key encryption, "secret handshakes," 9 or
other analog or digital mechanisms employed by a copyright holder to
restrict access to a work.'" A measure need not be sophisticated or actually
resist circumvention to qualify for protection under the statute."
The circumvention ban provides copyright holders a "paracopyright"
interest in the integrity of these mechanisms. 2 The DMCA's paracopyright
encourages copyright holders to engage in self-help by providing legal
enforcement for TPMs. In exchange, legislators hoped that copyright
holders would be more willing to distribute their works digitally and
through emerging online distribution models. 3 Yet, legislators also wanted
to avoid a "pay-per-use society" that would see the "elimination of print
or other hard-copy versions, the permanent encryption of all electronic
copies, and the adoption of business models that depend upon restricting
distribution and availability, rather than upon maximizing it."' 4 Thus, in

5. Gregory K. Klingspom, The Conference on FairUse (CONFU)and the Futureof Fair
Use Guidelines,23 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 119 (1999) ("Traditionally, it has been in your best
interest to limit fair use exceptions if you are a copyright owner, and in your best interest to
advocate expanding fair use if you are a net user of copyrighted works."). See also Matthew J. Sag,
Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and DoctrinalEfficiency, 81
TUL. L. REV. 187, 200 (2006) (describing how a copyright holder sought expansion of their
copyright in a 2005 Supreme Court case).
6. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 64 Fed. Reg. 66139 (proposed Nov. 24, 1999) (Notice of Inquiry)
[hereinafter 2000 Proposal].
7. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
8. Id. § 1201(a)(1).
9. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 127311, at *7 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006).
11. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d 294, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
12. Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1096 (2003).
13. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998).
14. Id. at 26, 36.
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order to avoid impairing the progress of science and the useful arts through
the DMCA's paracopyright, legislators created the regulatory "safetyvalve" mechanism of section 1201 (a)(1)(C)."5
On November 24, 1999, the U.S. Copyright Office solicited written
comments pertaining to a newly delegated statutory obligation in the
copyright act.' 6 The DMCA granted a new right to copyright holders and
simultaneously granted the Librarian of Congress, as the head of the
Copyright Office, the authority to issue exemptions to that right.' 7 Over the
course of this first rulemaking, the Office received 392 written comments
(including the four mentioned at the outset of this Article), held five public
hearings with thirty-four witnesses, and ultimately issued two
exemptions. 8 Those providing comment in hopes of influencing the
outcome included both producers and consumers of copyrighted materials,
in institutional as well as individual capacities. 9 Yet, under the DMCA,
the outcome of this rulemaking was not to be long-lived. The exemptions
authorized by the Office only remain in effect for three years, and every
three years the exemption determination must be made anew.2"
Consequently, the Copyright Office engaged in subsequent rulemakings
in 2003 and 2006.21
Users of copyrighted works criticized this periodic rulemaking
procedure for failing to produce outcomes consistent with the DMCA
mandate to exempt certain copyrighted works.22 While these stakeholders
targeted the DMCA for revision or repeal since shortly after its passage,23

15. Id. at 36-38.
16. 2000 Proposal, supra note 6.
17. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 1201, 112 Stat. 2860,2863-72
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201).
18. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2006).
19. Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A LegislativeHistory and Content
Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings,24 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 152 (2006).
20. Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006);
Librarian of Congress, Statement of the Librarian of Congress Relating to Section 1201
Rulemaking, availableat http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/2006_statement.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2007) ("These exemptions expire after three years, unless proponents prove their case
once again.").
21. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 67 Fed. Reg. 63578 (Oct. 15, 2002) [hereinafter 2003 Proposal]; Exemption
to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies,
70 Fed. Reg. 57526 (Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter 2006 Proposal].
22. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006); see, e.g., Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at
159-60 (2006).
23. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Towards More Sensible Anti-Circumvention
Regulations,availableat http://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers/fincrypt2.pdf(2000) (last

2007]

THE FAILURES AND POSSIBLE REDEMPTION OF THE DMCA ANTICIRCUMVENTION RULEMAKING

337

the rulemaking procedure-as specified in section 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E) and
implemented by the Copyright Office-remains incapable of fulfilling its
mandate to avoid adverse effects on noninfringing uses. 24 This failure
stems in part from the Office's construction of the 1201 (a)(1) mandate, and
in part from the structure of the rulemaking procedure itself. Because of
its failure, the anticircumvention rulemaking provision of the DMCA is
ripe for reform or abandonment.
This Article discusses the rulemaking mandate contained in
1201 (a)(1)(C) and its effectiveness, as the Copyright Office implemented
it, in achieving the stated purpose. The Article then evaluates possible
modifications to the DMCA which were introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives that purport to address shortcomings of the rulemaking
procedure. Through the course of this analysis, the Article will address the
technological and legal interests of copyright holders and users. These
interests include copyright holders' rights to reproduction and distribution
in light of the realities of digital "fixation," the possibilities for fair use
under the DMCA, and the interests created by the DMCA in preventing
circumvention and avoiding the adverse effects of the circumvention ban
on noninfringing uses. This Article concludes with recommended
approaches to achieve the reform necessary to advance the legitimate
interests of those involved in the anticircumvention rulemaking process.
II. THE ANTICIRCUMVENTION RULEMAKING PROVISION DID NOT
ACHIEVE ITS GOAL AND SHOULD BE REVISED OR ABANDONED

President Clinton enacted the DMCA in 1998.25 Congress passed the
law in part to bring the United States in line with two international
copyright treaties known as the World International Property Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms

visited Aug. 21, 2007) (discussing revision at repeal of the DMCA); see also David S. Touretzky,
FreeSpeech Rightsfor Programmers,44 COMM. ACM 23,25 (2001) (discussing repeal of sections
of the DMCA).
24. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS
UNDERTHE DMCA 6-8 (2006), http://www.eff.org/files/DMCAunintended v4.pdf See generally
Herman & Gandy, Jr., supranote 19 (discussing incapability ofrulemaking to avoid adverse effects
on noninfringing uses); see generally Heather A. Sapp, Garage Door Openers and Toner
Cartridges:Why Congress Should Revisit The Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA, 3
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 135 (2006) (discussing revisitation of anti-circumvention provisions).
25. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 1201, 112 Stat. 2860,2863-72
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201).
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Treaty.26 Despite disagreement about whether conformance with the
treaties required any new law to protect against digital piracy,27 in its final
form the DMCA appeared to exceed what the treaties required and
established a more restrictive copyright policy than was necessary to
implement the treaty obligations.28 Specifically, though the DMCA and
WIPO prohibitions against TPM circumvention constrain the same
behavior, the exceptions to that prohibition provided under the DMCA are
apparently more limited than those required by the WIPO treaties.29
A. The DMCA ProhibitsCircumvention of TechnologicalProtection
Measures, but the GeneralProhibitionIs Subject to Exception in Order
to Avoid Adverse Effects on Noninfringing Uses
The relevant portion of the DMCA contains a general prohibition
against "circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work."3 This general prohibition coincides with the
requirements of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, which requires signatories
to protect against and provide remedies for such circumvention. 3
However, a universal prohibition is not required by the Treaty, nor does
the DMCA go so far as to ban all circumvention without exception.32 To
do so would represent an even greater upset to the "delicate balance" the
existing copyright regime represents,33 possibly to an extent that legislators
would find such a policy difficult to support.34 Thus, despite the strong
protection such a prohibition would provide to copyright holders-whose

26. Id. at 2860; WIPO Copyright Treaty, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
wct/trtdocswo033.html (last visited Sept. 16,2007); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocswo034.html (last visited Sept; 16,
2007).
27. Sapp, supra note 24, at 137.
28. David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the

DMCA's Commentary,23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 962 ("A truly minimalist agenda to implement
the two WIPO treaties could have filled less than a page. By contrast, H.R. 2281 went a great deal
further for the benefit of copyright owners.") This is, in fact, precisely what a primary DMCA
advocate, then Patent Commissioner Bruce A. Lehman, sought and ultimately achieved with the
law. See also Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 133-34.
29. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(A) (2006), with WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11.
30.
31.
32.
33.
22 (1999)
34.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(B)-(E) (2006).
WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E) (2006); WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11.
David Nimmer et. al., The Metamorphosis of ContractInto Expand, 87 CALL. REV. 17,
(describing copyright as a "delicate balance").
See Nimmer, supra note 28, at 966-68.
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interests were exceedingly well regarded in the course of drafting the
DMCA- 35 the statute provides for exceptions to the general ban.36
The DMCA exempts "persons [who] are, or are likely to be . . .
adversely affected ... in their ability to make noninfringing uses of [a]
particular class of works" from the general prohibition against
circumvention. 37 However, this exemption is not self-executing. The
exemption is contingent on two preconditions, one considerably more
substantial than the other.38 First, the adverse effects must occur or be
likely to occur in the next three years.39 Second, the classes of works that
qualify for the exemption are established in a rulemaking procedure
outlined in the statute.4"
Compare this qualified exemption to the broader exemption permitted
by the WIPO Copyright Treaty.4 The language of the WIPO Copyright
treaty appears to tolerate an unqualified fair use exemption that allows
circumvention in order to make any lawful use of the work. Consequently,
the regulatory proceeding mandated by the DMCA imposes a greater
procedural burden than the WIPO Copyright Treaty on individuals who
wish to make noninfringing uses of copyrighted materials. Users whose
ability to make a noninfringing use of a copyrighted work is adversely
affected by a TPM must participate in the rulemaking to qualify for an
exemption from the statute, unless someone else took part on behalf of
the relevant class of copyrighted works in the last three years.
Placing this burden on those seeking to make fair use of a copyrighted
work alters the "delicate balance" of the existing copyright regime for
works protected by a TPM. Users seeking to exercise fair use of a work
not protected by a TPM do not need to seek prior approval or mount a
prospective defense in order to avail themselves of the use and the defense,
and copyright holders must address purported infringement on a case-bycase basis in an infringement action.42 For works protected by a TPM, the
DMCA shifts the burden to those seeking to undertake noninfringing uses

35. Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 129-50. Note, particularly, the discussion
concerning the advocacy of the Copyright Office during deliberation of H.R. 2281, which became
the DMCA, where it is asserted that the Copyright Office has been captured by the interests of the
copyright holders which it has been established to regulate. Id. at 139.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(E) (2006).
37. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11.
42. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright& LiteraryProperty § 78 (2007).
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to establish in advance that the TPM impairs their ability to do so.4 3 The
Copyright Office, in the course of construing and exercising the
1201(a)(1)(C) rulemaking authority, shifted this burden even more
substantially in favor of copyright holders, as discussed below in Part II.B.
The regulatory proceeding established by the DMCA represents a novel
venue for determining whether a noninfringing use will be permissible.'
Rather than a retrospective determination in a judicial proceeding,
permitted noninfringing uses under the DMCA are established
prospectively in a rulemaking.45 Though the rulemaking represents a
proceduraldeparture from past practice and the WIPO Copyright Treaty's
requirements, the language of the statute mandating the additional
regulatory burden does not require that the rulemaking yield substantively
narrower or different exemptions than the Treaty allows. The Treaty
permits uses "authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law."4' 6
The DMCA's language, while considerably more elaborate, does not
preclude allowing exemptions that meet the exact same description as
those permitted under the Treaty.47
The DMCA's exemption, 1201(a)(1)(B), reads as follows:
The prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to
persons who are users of a copyrighted work which is in a particular
class of works, if such persons are, or are likely to be in the
succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected by virtue of such
prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of that
particular class of works under this title, as determined under
subparagraph (C). 48
In the statute, subparagraph (A) contains the general prohibition against
circumvention, and subparagraph (C) describes the rulemaking
procedure.49 Both 1201(a)(1)(B) and the description of the rulemaking in
subparagraph (C) purport to exempt personsfrom the circumvention ban,
but the operative concern in both subsections pertains to classesofworks.5 °
A person seeking to make noninfringing use of a work is exempt only if

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 144.
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
Id.
Id.§ 1201(a)(1)(A) & (C).
Id.§ 1201(a)(1)(B)-(C).
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the work belongs to a "particular class of works."'" According to
subparagraph (C), the Librarian of Congress shall identify in a rulemaking
proceeding the classes of works that qualify-but upon a familiar basis;
classes of works are to be identified on the basis that users of such works
"are or are likely to be . . . adversely affected by the prohibition [on
circumvention] ... in their ability to make noninfringing uses" of such
works.52 The whole procedure is then constrained by the requirement that
the exemption determinations be redetermined every three years.53
Therefore, in order to qualify for exemption, people seeking to make
noninfringing uses must prospectively establish, through the rulemaking
procedure, the adverse effect of the circumvention ban on "their ability to
make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works."54 This language
represents an acknowledgment of the statutory and common law right to
fair use,55 and read in the context of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the
language represents a procedurally ornate implementation of exemptions
that Article 11 permits.56 However, despite the rulemaking's unique
procedural nature, nothing in the language of the statute requires the
rulemaking procedure to produce substantively different exemptions than
the Treaty would tolerate.57 Nonetheless, certain aspects of the DMCA's
rulemaking mandate to the Copyright Office, in practice, created
opportunity for departure from strict Treaty implementation and
recognition of underlying fair use considerations. These aspects generated
considerable debate in the process of undertaking the first rulemaking
determination," and shaped the rights of copyright holders and users ever
since.59

51. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B) (2006).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1201(a)(l)(a).
55. Pete Singer, Mounting a FairUse Defense to the Ani-Circumvention Provisionsof the
Digital Millenium CopyrightAct, 28 U. DAYTON L. REv. 111, 136 (2002).
56. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006), with WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 11. See also
Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 2281, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 671 (Nov.
2, 1998) (describing the DMCA as an implementation of the requirements of the WIPO Treaties
and as "balancing the interests of both copyright owners and users.").
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(B)-(E) (2006).
58. See Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 121.
59. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2006).
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B. The Copyright Office's Implementation of the Rulemaking
ProceedingDidNot Effectuate the StatutoryPurpose to Avoid Adverse
Effects on Noninfringing Uses
Section 1201 (a)(1)(C) requires the Librarian of Congress to engage in
a rulemaking determination in order to establish "class[es] of copyrighted
works" the users of which "are, or are likely to be... adversely affected"
by the circumvention ban in the following three years so that the users of
such works can be exempt from the ban.60 In the course of drafting the
DMCA, the precise nature of this rulemaking obligation underwent some
modifications. Most significant among the changes were the decision to
implement the general circumvention ban in the statute itself rather than
place the ban within the ambit of the regulatory proceeding, and the
decision to shift the delegation from the Secretary of Commerce to the
Copyright Office.6 1
The House Commerce Committee, which introduced the language to
the bill, described the purpose of the rulemaking proceeding as a "'failsafe' mechanism" for avoiding the harm caused when "real marketplace
developments . . . diminish otherwise lawful access" to categories of
copyrighted works.6 2 In its description of the nature of the delegated duty,
the Committee employs the following language contained in the statute:
"the focus must remain on whether the implementation of technological
protection measures (such as encryption or scrambling) has caused adverse
impact on the ability of users to make lawful uses," which include fair
uses.6 3 The House-Senate Conference Committee removed the general ban
from the ambit of the delegated authority and placed it in the statute,
shifted the delegation from the Secretary of Commerce to the Copyright
Office, and increased the time between rulemaking proceedings from two
to three years.' Despite not appearing in the Senate version of the bill, the
regulatory procedure for issuing exemptions introduced by the House
Commerce Committee appeared in the final bill sent to President Clinton.6 5

60. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) & (D) (2006).
61. Herman & Gandy, Jr., supranote 19, at 142-50 (discussing the legislative history of the
DMCA).
62. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
63. Id. at 37.
64. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998); Herman & Gandy, Jr., supranote 19, at 148 (discussing
the legislative history of the DMCA).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
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The DMCA went into effect on November 29, 1999 and required the
Librarian of Congress to establish by October 28, 2000 which classes of
copyrighted works, if any, were to be exempt from the circumvention ban
for the succeeding three years.6 6 The statute sets forth several criteria for
the Librarian to consider in making the determination, which roughly
coincide with the judicial and statutory test for fair use, subject to some
modifications necessary to arrive at a generally applicable prospective rule
rather than a retrospective determination.67 In particular, the statute
requires the Librarian to examine "the impact that the prohibition.., has
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or
research."68 This language appears nearly verbatim in the statutory
implementation of fair use.6 9 The Librarian must also consider how the
circumvention would affect the market for the copyrighted works, which
parallels another consideration in the fair use analysis.7 °
Despite establishing this delegation and setting forth specific factors to
be taken into account in the course of the determination, the rulemaking
mandate in 1201(a)(1)(C) leaves considerable discretion in the hands of
the Librarian. 7' Besides the requirement that the rulemaking be conducted
triennially, the statute is largely silent on procedural requirements of the
rulemaking.72 In addition to the factors specified which the Librarian must
consider, other factors may be considered if the Librarian considers them
appropriate.73 The law leaves it to the Librarian to establish the standard
of proof according to which the facts should be determined.74 In what
omission, the statute also fails to define
turned out to be a significant
"class[es] of works."75 This permissive delegation strengthens the analogy

66. 2006 Proposal, supranote 21, at 57527; see 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
67. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i)-(v) (2006), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (implementing
by statute the judicial doctrine of fair use and mentioning the need to consider the impact of
enforcing a copyright on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research,
as well as the impact of the use on the market for copyrighted works).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C)(iii) (2006).
69. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iii) (2006), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iv) (2006); 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
71. Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 143.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006). But see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring the
Librarian of Congress to consult with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information
of the Department of Commerce).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v) (2006).
74. See id. § 1201(a)(l)(C).
75. See id. § 1201(a)(1).
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between the judicial doctrine of fair use, "an equitable rule of reason, 7 6
and the regulatory proceeding described in section 1201 (a)(1)(C). Thus,
the Librarian has considerable latitude to craft appropriate remedies to
protect fair use.
Since the DMCA was enacted, the Copyright Office conducted three
of the required rulemakings-in 2000, 2003 and 2006. 77 Two of the
proceedings specifically invited comment on more than the substantive
question which the Librarian was charged to ascertain, that is, whether
"[persons] are, or are likely to be, adversely affected . . . due to the
prohibition" against circumvention contained in section 1201(a)(1)(A). 78
In 2000, the notice of proposed rulemaking sought comment to aid the
Copyright Office in resolving the ambiguity in the statute concerning how
to classify works.7 9
In the 2003 notice of proposed rulemaking, the Office set forth the
conclusion reached in the 2000 proceeding as controlling, but invited
participants to "argue for adoption of alternative approaches."8 ° The first
call for comment also invited participants to identify factors that the
Librarian should take into account in the determination but are not
specified in the statute.8 ' In fact, because the rulemaking constituted such
a novel approach to the problem of arbitrating between the interests of
copyright holders and the users of copyrighted works, and because the
statutory delegation left so much unsaid about the procedure of the
rulemaking, participants dedicated a significant proportion of their efforts
in the first two rulemakings to arguments concerning the legislative intent
underlying the delegation itself.82
In their comments during the first two rulemaking proceedings,
participants particularly concerned themselves with three apparent
ambiguities left unresolved by the language of the statute. Comments
addressed the underlying policy goals of the rulemaking provision, the
proper standard of proof for establishing adverse effects of the
circumvention ban, and the proper method of classifying works to comply

76.
77.
78.
note 21.
79.
80.
81.
82.

H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 3 (1992).
2000 Proposal, supranote 6; 2003 Proposal, supranote 21; 2006 Proposal, supra note 21.
See 2000 Proposal, supra note 6; 2003 Proposal, supranote 21; 2006 Proposal, supra
2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 66142.
2003 Proposal, supra note 21, at 63580.
2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 66143.
Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 154.
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with the DMCA's mandate. 3 Participants usually discussed policy
motivations for the rulemaking in the course of justifying a specific
exemption.84 Should the Office fail to effectuate the underlying policy, the
delegation would not have served its purpose and would be ripe for
modification or abandonment. The remaining concerns, though procedural,
also bore serious implications for the substantive outcome the rulemaking
was likely to produce and led to protracted debate among participants and
the Office.
1. Standard of Proof
Participants' comments addressed the proper standard of proof for
establishing whether a party was adversely affected by the section
1201(a)(1)(A) circumvention ban.85 The Copyright Office invited this
discussion, not by explicitly requesting comments in the notice of
proposed rulemaking, but by its own erroneous construction of the
standard.86 The statute requires an exemption be granted upon a finding
that the ban "adversely affect[s]" noninfringing use.8 7 The Office asserted
that it would exempt a class of copyrighted works upon a showing that the
circumvention ban had "a substantial adverse effect on noninfringing
use."88 In the subsequent proceedings in 2003 and 2006, the Office
persisted in its error, requiring parties seeking an exemption to show "a
substantial adverse effect."89
When the Copyright Office consulted with the Department of
Commerce's Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information
regarding the 2003 rulemaking as required,9" the Assistant Secretary
brought this error to the attention of the Copyright Office. 9' In defense of
its position, the Office asserted that the language came directly from the

83. Id. at 158-65.
84. Id. at 158 (discussing the policy arguments asserted by participants in the rulemaking).
85. Id. at 160-63 (discussing the policy arguments asserted by participants in the
rulemaking).
86. See 2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 66141.
87. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C) (2006) (emphasis added).
88. 2000 Proposal, supranote 6, at 66141 (emphasis added).
89. 2003 Proposal, supranote 21, at 63579; 2006 Proposal, supra note 21, at 57528.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C) (2006).
91. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62011, at 62012-13 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Final
Rule].
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legislative history.9 2 On the basis of its construction of the legislative
intent, the Librarian rejected the advice of the Assistant Secretary.9 3 In the
2003 Final Rule, the Office provided an additional justification for its
departure from the statutory language. It argued that requiring a showing
of a "substantial adverse effect" was not, in fact, a heightened standard,
and that "substantial" meant nothing more than that the proof "must have
substance., 94 In the 2006 Notice of Inquiry, the Office again asserted that
exemptions would be granted only upon a showing of "a 'substantial'
adverse effect on noninfringing uses .... ""
The Office's argument justifying its standard of proof suffers from a
variety of flaws. The Office argues, in essence, that requiring an
exemption-seeker to show a "substantial adverse effect" (the burden
employed since the first rulemaking) is synonymous with requiring a
"substantial showing of an adverse effect on noninfringing uses. '"96
However, these are different standards. In the first, "substantial" qualifies
the effect, and in the second it qualifies the showing. The language of
section 1201 (a)(1)(C) supports neither. The law mandates an exemption
upon a showing of actual or likely adverse effects. 97 Given that the text of
the statute is not ambiguous on this point, there is no reason to consult the
legislative history to construe or amplify the meaning of the language.
Furthermore, the Office's interpretation of legislative intent is not
persuasive, because the House Judiciary Committee authored the report
cited by the Office after the bill passed the House. 98 The Commerce
Committee's report, authored contemporaneously with the addition of the
rulemaking procedure to the bill, does not use the word "substantial" in
describing the required showing. 99 The legislative history's own ambiguity
about the character of the required showing further militates in favor of
disregarding the muddled legislative history and using other methods to

92. Id. at 62012.
93. 2003 Proposal, supra note 21, at 63579; 2006 Proposal, supra note 21, at 57528.
94. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62013.
95. 2006 Proposal, supra note 21, at 57528.
96. Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 169 (discussing the manner in which the
J...]
to another." Id. at 170).
Librarian "transposed the notion of substantiality from one context
97. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D) (2006).
98. Herman & Gandy, Jr., supranote 19, at 169 (discussing the persuasiveness of the various
documents in the legislative history of the DMCA).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
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construe the standard contained in the text of the statute itself, such as the
language's plain meaning."°°
The manner in which the Copyright Office implemented the standard
of proof contradicts its assertion that the standard is functionally
equivalent to a substantial showing of an adverse effect. In 2006, the
Librarian declined to issue one exemption on the grounds that it was "not
warranted simply because some uses are unavailable in the particular
manner that a user seeks to make the use when other options are
available."' 0 ' This justification appears to illustrate the difference between
a showing of an adverse effect on the one hand, and a showing of a
substantial adverse effect on the other. Parties seeking the exemption
apparently prevailed in demonstrating that the circumvention ban
adversely affected a noninfringing use, yet the adverse effect was not
"substantial" enough to qualify for an exemption.
2. Classes of Works
The statute requires the Copyright Office to identify and "publish any
class of copyrighted works" so that users of works contained in the class
can avail themselves of the section 1201 (a)(1)(B) exemption to the general
ban in 1201(a)(1)(A). °2 Unlike the matter of the standard of proof, the
proper system of classification constitutes a genuine ambiguity in the
statute. The statute does not specify any particular method of
classification.0 3
The House Commerce Committee, which was responsible for adding
the rulemaking procedure to the bill, provides a meaningful starting point:
"[t]he Committee intends that the 'particular class of copyrighted works'
be a narrow and focused subset of the broad categories of works . . .
identified in Section 102 of the Copyright Act."'" Section 102 describes
the types of works entitled to copyright protection.'0 5 Consequently, in
order to effectuate the legislative intent underlying section 1201 (a)(1)(B),

100. See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48:2 (7th ed. 2007) ("[W]hen the text of the
statute and legislative history disagree, the text controls.").
101. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68472, at 68478 (published Nov. 27, 2006) [hereinafter 2006
Final Rule].
102. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(D) (2006).
103. See id. § 1201(a)(1).
104. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) (1978).
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a proper classification of works must begin by identifying a type of work
initially entitled to copyright protection, and then go on to identify some
"narrow and focused" subset of that work for exemption.l°6
Because the statute left this gap for the Office to fill, the first notice of
inquiry encouraged rulemaking participants to suggest systems of
classification.I0 7 Participants took up the Copyright Office's invitation.0 8
The nature of the classification system used by the Copyright Office
delimits the universe of possible exemptions. Participants with a stake in
the outcome of an exemption determination had an interest in influencing
this determination as well.
In the course of the rulemaking, the chief disagreement concerning the
classification of works hinged on whether the classification could take into
account the users or intended uses of the works.'0 9 Copyright holders
argued that the classification must not account for such things, while those
seeking exemptions argued that it should." 0 In 2000 and 2003, the
Assistant Secretary agreed with exemption seekers that classes of works
could refer to users and uses."' The final rules in 2000 and 2003
concluded that the classification of works could rely on nothing besides
information about the work itself. 12 Classifications could only refer to
information about the work, such as the medium of distribution or the type
of TPM employed to protect it.113
The Copyright Office extensively defended this interpretation of the
statute in its 2000 Final Rule, and in doing so relied on the legislative
history discussed above." 4 Ultimately, however, the only support the
Office provided for its determination was that Congress's utter silence on
the proper method of classifying works was "strong evidence" in favor of

106.
107.
108.
109.

See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 38.
2000 Proposal, supra note 6, at 66142.
Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 164.
Id.

110. Id.

111. Id. at 175.
112. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62012 ("[I]t is not permissible to classify a work by
reference to the type of user or use .... "); Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64556, at 64559
(published Oct. 27, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Final Rule].
113. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62012; 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64559.
114. 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64559-61.
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the Office's interpretation." 5 Despite this purportedly strong evidence, in
could
2006 the Office reversed itself and determined that classifications
6
work."
a
of
use
intended
or
user
the
account
take into
The type of exemptions granted under the two rules illustrate the
significance of the distinction-and the consequence of the Copyright
Office's ultimate reversal of its position in 2006. In the first two
rulemakings, the Librarian exempted two and four classes of works,
respectively." 7 The Offices in those two years refused to issue exemptions
based on classifications of works that made reference to users or intended
uses of the works." 8 As a result, the exemptions in those years were
general in nature, such as the 2003 exemption for "[c]omputer programs
and video games distributed in formats that have become obsolete and
which require the original media or hardware as a condition of access.""' 9
Under the new rule in 2006, the Office named six exemptions, including
an exemption for
[c]omputer programs and video games distributed in formats that
have become obsolete and that require the original media or
hardware as a condition of access, when circumvention is
accomplished for the purpose of preservation or archival
20
reproduction of published digital works by a library or archive.
The difference between the exemptions granted in 2003 and the
exemptions granted in 2006 is not insubstantial. By permitting the
classification to refer to the user or intended use, the Copyright Office
simultaneously made individual exemptions easier to obtain and reduced
their general applicability. 121 Parties seeking an exemption can now more
readily establish, by reference to their intended use, that their asserted
noninfringing use is, or will be, adversely affected by the circumvention
ban. However, success in obtaining an exemption based on such a
classification will be shared with a smaller class of prospective
115. Id.at 64561 ("[T]he fact that Congress selected language in the statute and legislative
history that avoided suggesting that classes of works could be defined by reference to users or uses
is strong evidence that such classification was not within Congress' contemplation.").
116. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68473.
117. 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64564; 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62013.
118. 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64559; 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62012.
119. 2003 Final Rule, supranote 92, at 62014.
120. 2006 Final Rule, supranote 101, at 68474.
121. Id.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 12

noninfringing users. As a result, it is not immediately clear whether
copyright owners or users come out ahead in the aggregate after the
Office's change of position, or whether it is a wash.
The increased specificity allowed under the new "class of works"
standard highlights a weakness in the rulemaking procedure's ability to
identify and issue exemptions that protect noninfringing uses from adverse
effect. In 2003, users asked for and were granted a general exemption after
showing that the DMCA circumvention ban impaired their ability to make
122
noninfringing uses of certain computer programs and video games.
Following the 2006 rulemaking, the exact same works could only be
accessed by certain people for certain reasons. The Librarian narrowed the
scope of the exemption in part because the new "classes of works"
guideline permitted it to do so, and in part because of the identity and
intended use of the party seeking the exemption.123 The Internet Archive,
which sought the computer program exemption, did not petition for an
exemption narrowed in scope by reference to its identity or intended use.
It asked for the same general exemption the Copyright Office granted three
years prior. 12 Nothing changed about the relevant facts, which in 2003
justified the broader exemption. Only the willingness of the Copyright
Office to make reference to uses and users in classifying works changed. 125
As a result of the new practice to limit the scope of exemptions by
reference to use and user, a user seeking to make a noninfringing use of
the exact same work from one year to the next may or may not be exempt,
contingent only upon the identities and occupations of participants in the
triennial rulemaking. This change could increase participation in the
rulemaking process on the part of exemption seekers. Users of copyrighted
works seeking to protect their interest in making noninfringing uses can no
longer rely on benefiting from an exemption granted to another party
because of the possibility that the Office may limit the scope of each
exemption with reference to the party seeking the exemption.
An example can illustrate how the various procedural choices of the
Copyright Office can perversely impair the ability of users to make
noninfringing uses. If a teacher and a news reporter both seek an

122. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62014.
123. 2006 Final Rule, supranote 101, at 68474.
124. The Internet Archive, Proposed Class or Classes of Copyrighted Work(s) To Be
Exempted, availableat http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/kahle-sum.pdf(last visited
Aug. 21, 2007).
125. See 2006 Final Rule, supranote 101, at 68474.

2007]

THE FAILURES AND POSSIBLE REDEMPTION OF THE DMCA ANTICIRCUMVENTION RULEMAKING

351

exemption to in order to engage in criticism, under the old "class of
works" rule, an exemption granted to one would apply to them both.
However, because an exemption granted under the new rule could make
reference to occupation of the user, both would have to participate in the
rulemaking to secure an exemption. Unfortunately, this also means that
both the teacher and the reporter individually risk failing to meet the
burden that exemption-seekers show a "substantial adverse effect." This
could lead to an exemption for one that the other could not enjoy, even if
the facts supported a generalized exemption under the old rule.
The net effects of the Copyright Office's implementation choices are
especially pernicious in light of the dynamics of the community of people
who make noninfringing uses. While fair use has some institutional
defenders such as libraries, educational institutions, and the media, these
institutions represent occupation-specific subsets of the broad array of fair
use interests. Individual users of copyrighted materials could have fair use
interests not generally represented by these institutions, for example,
the ability to view a copyrighted movie
personal noninfringing uses like
26
with friends in a private home.1
Institutional defenders of fair use have a greater likelihood of obtaining
an exemption from the Office. The Office defined a "substantial adverse
impact," to exclude "individual cases,"' 127 making individual participation
less meaningful and individual participants less likely to obtain
exemptions. Besides being in a better position to participate in a
rulemaking proceeding in general,2 8 institutions are in a far better position
than individuals to make the showing required by the Office. 129 Institutions
possess the resources to access a volume of information about the adverse
effects of the circumvention ban not generally available to individuals,
who must rely on personal anecdotes. While the Office has generally made
the comment procedure itself open and inexpensive, participants need
substantial resources to participate effectively. 3

126. See Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright,23 CARDOZOARTS &ENT. L.J. 567,572
(2006) ("[L]arge groups with diffuse interests-like the general public-will be underrepresented
[in the legislative process] relative to smaller groups with more concentrated interests.").
127. 2000 Final Rule, supranote 112, at 64562.
128. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic RepublicanJustificationfortheBureaucraticState, 105 HARV.
L. REv. 1511, 1565 (1992) ("Regulated entities are well organized and generally well funded, and
they often have strong interests at stake, which they do not share with the polity as a whole.").
129. Id.
130. Id.; see also Electronic Frontier Foundation, DMCA Triennial Rulemaking: Failing the
Digital Consumer, December 1, 2005, http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/copyrightoffice/DMCA_
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Exacerbating the harm to individual interests in noninfringing uses, the
new "class of works" rule results in exemptions like that made for the
Internet Archive, which is restricted to users in certain occupations. With
these narrower exemptions, individuals are now less able to benefit from
the participation of institutional exemption-seekers like archivists and
educational institutions. To the extent that noninfringing uses exercised by
individuals are not represented by the institutional defenders of fair use,
it is unlikely those unrepresented interests will enjoy exemptions under the
Copyright Office's present implementation of the rulemaking procedure.
C. StructuralElements of the Rulemaking ProceedingPreventedthe
Copyright Office from Effectuating the Statutory Purposeto Avoid
Adverse Effects on Noninfringing Uses
Beyond the problems caused by the implementation of the rulemaking,
certain structural aspects of the delegation itself impair the ability for the
rulemaking process to effectuate the statute's purpose. These structural
aspects influence the substantive result of the rulemaking as much as the
choices made by the Copyright Office in the course of exercising its
delegated authority. However, it turns out that choices made by the
Copyright Office, in light of the structural limitations imposed by section
1201(a)(1)(C), further impaired the policy's ability to achieve the stated
purpose to avoid adverse effects on noninfringing uses.
The rulemaking must occur every three years.1 ' Upon introducing the
rulemaking to the bill, the Commerce Committee intended that with every
rulemaking "the assessment of adverse impacts on particular categories of
works is to be determined de novo."'32 This requirement reflects the
drafters' intent that the procedure operate as a safety valve that would
restore the ability to undertake lawful uses in the face of market effects
that diminished such ability. 33 Legislators and other participants in the
drafting process expressed particular concern about the possibility that
widespread use of TPMs would result in a "pay-per-use" society in which
copyrighted works are distributed only on a use-by-use basis. 3 4 Such an

rulemakingbroken.pdf [hereinafter Failing](describing the barriers to individual participation in
the rulemaking procedure).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006).
132. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 37(1998).
133. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68478.
134. 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64561.
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outcome would eviscerate doctrines such as fair
use and first sale, which
135
serve as safety valves in the copyright regime.
The triennial nature of the proceedings, however, amplified the
DMCA's effects on noninfringing uses rather than alleviating them. For
example, in 2000 and 2003, the Copyright Office granted an exemption for
"[c]ompilations consisting of lists of websites blocked by [commercially
marketed] filtering software . ...

,1

In 2006, the exemption was

denied-not because of affirmative changes in the marketplace or because
nobody sought the exemption, but because the party seeking the exemption
chose to "rest on the record from three years ago," and argued that
"nothing ha[d] changed.' ' 137 In this example, the Office applied a
misguided interpretation of the directive that the determination be made
de novo. As a result, it foreclosed an exemption previously granted despite
the absence of any affirmative evidence that the conditions that justified
the exemption three years prior changed.
Even though the legislative history appears to compel the Copyright
Office to reach the conclusion it did for the filter list exemption, its hands
were not tied. Requiring exemptions to be determined de novo does not
require that exemptions previously granted be held to the same burden of
proof as proposed exemptions never endorsed by the Librarian. It would
be proper, in light of the underlying purpose of the regulatory proceeding,
to shift the burden to those seeking to overturn an exemption to prove that
market conditions have changed in such a way that obviate the need for the
exemption. The underlying assumption that market conditions always
change in favor of parties seeking exemptions, which seems to animate the
policy to keep the burden of proof on them, cannot be justified. If that
were the case there would be no need for the triennial safety valve in the
first place. Furthermore, the DMCA expressly authorizes the Librarian to
consider "such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate," which
would tolerate considering the prior grant of an exemption, the
congressional record notwithstanding.138 In light of the statutory delegation
and its purpose to ensure exemptions are granted in response to market
effects on noninfringing uses, the Office's strict anti-exemption
interpretation of the de novo requirement does not seem to be justified.

135. See Failing,supra note 130.

136. 37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2003).
137. See 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68478.
138.

17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v) (2006).
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In a similar fashion, the Librarian abdicated the legislative authority to
make other proposed exemptions, groundlessly asserting that "the
Librarian does not have the power to fashion" certain classes of works and
that some exemptions are "more properly a subject of legislation."' 39 This
self-imposed limitation substantially impairs the ability of the rulemaking
to effectuate its statutory purpose, whether the limitation is real or
imagined. It also contradicts the language of the DMCA and the legislative
intent behind the incorporation of the delegated authority.
In the 2000 rulemaking, participants sought an exemption for "works
embodied in copies which have been lawfully acquired by users who
subsequently seek to make non-infringing uses thereof."'' 40 The Librarian
denied the exemption, in part because it felt the proposed exemption
exceeded the scope of its authority.' 4 1 Section 1201(a)(1)(C) gives the
Librarian the authority to issue exemptions for classes of works, and does
not limit this power except by specifying a non-exclusive list of factors to
consider. 42 In particular, the statute contains no limitation on the breadth
of the exempt classes, provided the librarian makes the required
determination that the DMCA impairs or will impair noninfringing uses
for the class. 43 In defense of its argument, the Copyright Office again
referred to the legislative history of the DMCA. In particular, it cited a
version of the DMCA which contained a similar exemption that passed the
House but did not ultimately become law.'" The removal of this express
exemption could support the inference drawn by the Copyright
Office-that Congress did not support the exemption. However, the
legislative history of the DMCA presents an alternative explanation.
The version of the bill passed by the Senate contained neither the
express exemption nor the rulemaking procedure. 45 The House version
contained both the express exemption and the rulemaking procedure. 46
' As
a result of the House-Senate Conference, the bill lost the express
exemption for "initial lawful access," but retained the rulemaking
procedure. 147 Consequently, retaining the rulemaking procedure could have
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64573.
Id. at 64572.
Id. at 64573.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
See id.
2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64573.
S.R. 2037, 105th Cong. (as passed by the Senate, May 14, 1998).
H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (as passed by the House, Aug. 4, 1998).
H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (as reported by the Conference Committee, Oct. 8, 1998).
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justified removing the express exemption, that is, the express exemption
was removed not because the exemption was "disapproved" but because
the rulemaking obviated the need for an express exemption. Nothing in the
legislative history sheds any more light upon the reason for removing the
express exemption, so there is no reason to prefer the explanation
proffered by the Copyright Office to this alternate explanation.
However, there is a reason to prefer the alternative explanation that the
passage did not appear in the final version of the bill because it was
unnecessary. As far as exemptions to circumvention are concerned, the
Senate bill clearly favored the interests of copyright owners while the
House version favored users.148 The DMCA negotiations posed a serious
collective action problem for Congress which was incapable of setting the
proper balance between these interests.149 Rather than name an express
exemption, Congress chose to punt the entire matter to the Copyright
Office, delegating substantial authority to identify the ways the DMCA
interfered with noninfringing uses and to make exemptions to the general
ban on circumvention. 50 Refusing to exercise that authority does not
constitute deference to the legislature, but an abdication of the role created
for the Copyright Office in crafting the DMCA's effect on users of
copyrighted works. 5 '
The very nature of rulemaking makes it difficult for the 1201 (a)(1)(C)
exemption proceeding to arrive at a proper outcome. As described above,
the challenges individuals face when confronted with a rulemaking impair
their ability to advocate for their interests in such a venue. The interest
group gap between copyright holders and exemption-seekers is substantial.
In 2003, both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) participated in the rulemaking. 52
148. Cf S.R. 2037, 105th Cong. (as passed by the Senate, May 14, 1998), with H.R. 2281,
105th Cong. (as passed by the House, Aug. 4, 1998).
149. Herman & Gandy, Jr., supra note 19, at 147.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006); Herman & Gandy, Jr., supranote 19, at 143 ("[Tlhe
statute gives tremendous leeway to the Secretary .... ).
151. See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998). The House Commerce Committee, which
introduced the rulemaking provision, originally introduced the regulatory scheme to constitute the
entirety of the anticircumvention ban. Id. The purpose for using a regulatory rather than statutory
scheme was "to provide greater flexibility in enforcement," which suggests a deference to
noninfringing uses. Id.
152. U.S. Copyright Office, Reply Comments on Rulemaking on Anticircumvention:Page 2,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/reply/reply2.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2007);
U.S. Copyright Office, Comments on Rulemaking on Exemptions on Anticircumvention, available
at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2003/comments/index.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
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The EFF is a rare interest group that represents the fair use interests of
individuals (rather than members of a professional or other
organization),' 53 and at the time had an annual budget of two million
dollars and a 23-person staff.'54 The MPAA, just one of many industry
groups representing the interests of copyright holders in the rulemaking,
was reported in 2004 to have "annual budget of $70 million and staff of
210."' 5 Because most individual fair use is noncommercial in nature and
does not generate revenue, the resources of groups representing individual
fair use interests are unlikely to ever match the resources of the copyright
holders and their many interest groups. This is a natural consequence of
the fair use doctrine, which strongly favors noncommercial uses when
classifying a use as noninfringing.' 56
In sum, the DMCA rulemaking procedure failed to achieve its goal of
operating as a safety valve for noninfringing uses. The very structure of
the rulemaking itself creates further opportunity to impair noninfringing
use, despite the rulemaking's purpose to facilitate such use. The structure
of the delegation and the limiting interpretations given it by the Copyright
Office rendered the proceeding dysfunctional, favoring the organized and
wealthy interests of copyright holders to the detriment of individual users
of copyrighted material. The Office repeatedly and with dubious
justification construed its 1201(a)(1)(C) mandate in such a way as to
justify denying or otherwise limiting exemptions. By frequently rejecting
recommendations of the Assistant Secretary for Communications, whose
input generally coincided with the requests of exemption-seekers, the
Office reinforced the imbalanced nature of the triennial proceeding and its
outcomes.
D. Case Study: CSS
Examining a particular technological protection measure can help to
illustrate the cumulative effect these numerous shortcomings impose on
noninfringing uses. Content Scramble System (CSS) qualifies as a

153. Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF:About, availableat http://www.eff.org/about/ (last
visited Aug. 21, 2007).
154. Jefferson Graham, EFFUrges RIAA to ChangeLegal Tune, USA TODAY, Aug. 4,2003,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-08-04-effx.htm.
155. Kenneth Bredemeier, Want a Top Job?, WASHINGTONIAN MAG., Sept. 2004, at 143.
156. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,451 (1984) (explaining
that commercial uses of copyrighted material are presumptively unfair).
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1201(a)(1)(A) measure that "effectively controls access."' 5 7 Copyright
owners employ CSS on DVDs to protect against unauthorized use and
access.' 58 CSS operates as a system of public key cryptography, encrypting
the copyrighted material until such time as a user with an authorized key
decrypts it.' 59 Fortunately, users do not have to find where they misplaced
their DVD keys or sit down with a slide rule and perform the necessary
calculations by hand to perform the decryption when they want to watch
a movie. Instead, authorized keys are programmed into every.DVD player
and the machine automatically performs the decryption in a fashion
transparent to the user.16 0 Even though as a matter of course typical DVD
players always grant DVD users access to the copyrighted material, the
DMCA prohibits circumventing CSS.161
Despite being ordinarily able to access to the contents of a DVD by
using a sanctioned DVD player programmed with the necessary keys,
users petitioned the Copyright Office for a variety of exemptions to the
circumvention ban. 162 The way CSS was implemented, it allows the
copyright holder to control not just access, but use of copyrighted
materials. 163 The DVD Copy Control Association, the key issuing
authority, only issues keys to software programmers and hardware
manufacturers who sign a licensing agreement that requires licensees
implement the entire CSS specification." 6 The CSS specification, which
has been described as the "product of a committee of lawyers,"' 65 describes
not just a method to control access to copyrighted material, but also to
157.
158.
159.
160.

Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 308.

161. Id. at 318.

162. 2000 Final Rule,supranote 112, at 64570 (denying a blanket exemption for "audiovisual
works on [digital versatile discs]," and an exemption for accessing lawfully acquired copies); 2003
Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62016-17 (denying exemptions for "[a]udiovisual works stored on
DVDs that are not available in Region 1 DVD format... ," "[v]ideo games stored on DVDs that
are not available in Region 1 DVD format... ," "ancillary audiovisual works distributed on DVDs
encrypted by CSS," and "[a]udiovisual works ... the DVD copies of which are tethered to
operating systems that prevent rendering on alternative operating systems.").
163. 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64568.
164. DVD Copy Control Association, DVD CCA CSS License and Procedures, availableat
http://cryptome.org/dvdcca-css.zip (last visited, Aug. 21, 2007).
165. Rick Merritt, Judge Rules Against DVD Consortium, EE TIMES ONLINE, availableat

http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=198701186 (last visited Aug. 21, 2007)
(describing an unpublished opinion in a suit between the DVD Copy Control Association and a
licensee).
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control the manner in which the copyrighted material may be used.'66 The
CSS specification allows the copyright owner to control uses such as
when, where and how the material may be copied, displayed, or
accessed.' 67 CSS prevents uses without regard to whether the uses would
infringe a copyright. Users who wish to make noninfringing uses
otherwise adversely affected by these CSS-imposed technological
limitations, like Tim Lee, who wanted to display his DVDs using an
unlicensed player,'68 must either obtain an exemption from the Copyright
Office or violate section 1201 (a)(1)(A).
Since 2000, the Copyright Office only once exempted a class of works
that could include CSS encoded DVDs.'69 The 2006 exemption, tolerated
under the Librarian's new standard to allow classes of works to make
reference to the user or intended use, 7 ° constitutes an incredibly narrow
exemption-"audiovisual works included in the educational library of a
college or university's film or media studies department, when
circumvention is accomplished for the purpose of making compilations of
portions of those works for educational use in the classroom by media
studies or film professors."17 ' Lee's proposed use for the purpose of
private viewing could not be made without violating the anticircumvention
ban under this class. This rule even prevents high school teachers and
private individuals, such as educators of home-schooled children, from
making the same use of the same works for the same educational purpose.
The Copyright Office dealt at length with CSS in its 2000 final
determination. i 2 It expressed concern that Congress apparently did not
anticipate the use of TPMs that control both use and access, like CSS.'73
Thus, in this first ruling the Copyright Office discovered a serious
shortcoming in the DMCA's anticircumvention regime's capacity for
avoiding adverse effects on noninfringing use in light of these dual use
TPMs, and remarked that "[i]t would be helpful if Congress were to clarify

166. DVD
Copy
Control
Association,
CSS
Specifications,
available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/seminar/intemet-client/readings/week2/02-08CSS.pdf (last visited,
Mar. 30, 2007).
167. Id. at A-13.
168. Comment from Tim Lee, supra note 1.
169. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68478.
170. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
171. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68473-74.
172. 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64567-69.
173. Id. at 64568.
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its intent.' 74 The Librarian declined to issue an exemption for CSSprotected DVDs for fear of"ventur[ing]
too far on this issue in the absence
' 75
of congressional guidance.'
In the two subsequent rulemakings, users attempted to describe a class
of works that would carve an exemption for noninfringing uses of CSSencoded DVDs.' 76 Only one satisfied the Librarian, who declined to issue
every exemption that would allow circumvention of CSS except the media
studies exemption. 77
' Consequently, the majority of noninfringing uses that
CSS adversely affects have never been exempted from the circumvention
ban since it went into effect in 2000. Only under the new "class of works"
rule was even this exemption possible. The Office suggests it would be
"difficult" to issue a more broadly applicable version of the same
exemption for a class of works that did not refer to the users or intended
use of the copyrighted material.178 This would be difficult, first because the
exemption-seekers did not make the case for the broader exemption, and
because the broader exemption would have "adverse consequences...
[that] would outweigh the prohibition's adverse effects to a narrow
noninfringing use. '
This example demonstrates many of the structural and decisional
shortcomings of the rulemaking "safety valve" mechanism. In granting the
media studies exemption, the Copyright Office acknowledges that some
noninfringing uses fall outside the scope of the exemption, but that they
are "narrow" and that unspecified "adverse consequences" partially justify
prohibiting them. The parties seeking the media studies exemption were
able to show a "substantial adverse effect" on their use, but, perversely
parties seeking an exemption that would allow a broader class of people
to make the same noninfringing uses would have a more difficult time
making the same showing.
The media studies exemption also illustrates how the structure of the
rulemaking influences the outcome. The Office granted the media studies

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62015-17 (declining to issue exemptions for initial
lawful access, ancillary works on DVDs, non region- I DVDs, DVDs encrypted by CSS, and DVDs
that must be played on certain operating systems); 2006 Final Rule, supranote 101, at 68478-79
(declining to issue exemptions for the purpose of viewing DVDs on Linux, and region encoded
DVDs).
177. See generally 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92; 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101.
178. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68474.
179. Id.
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exemption in response to proposals by "film and media studies
professors," who were able to draw on the resources of educational
institutions to make the case for their exemption. 8 °Individuals petitioning
for a more generally applicable exemption-such as one that would allow
anyone to make compilations of films in their private libraries for
educational use-cannot benefit from the participation of the media
studies professors. They must seek their own exemption, without the
benefit of ready access to institutional resources. Then, three years later,
they would have to perform that work again. It is possible then, and
perhaps likely, that individual users will choose instead to forego seeking
permission through the rulemaking process, forego the otherwise lawful
uses, or unlawfully circumvent CSS. Either way, the rulemaking
proceeding will not accomplish its goal to operate as a "safety valve."
This scenario played out with respect to CSS. In 2006, the Copyright
Office cited the existence of software that enables DVD playback under
Linux as justification for refusing to issue an exemption for such use.181
However, properly licensed and authorized software allowing for DVD
playback on Linux did not exist until mid-2006. 82 Programmers wrote the
first program to allow Linux users to circumvent CSS in 1999,183 and
created libdvdcss, a software library that circumvents CSS, in 2001. 184The
libdvdcss software library was widely implemented to allow playback of
DVDs on computers running the Linux operating system.'85 The lack of an
exemption and any legitimate software forced users for five years to

180. See Comments of Peter Dechemey et al., at 20 (describing the practices of the University
of Pennsylvania Library and Cinema Studies Program, and including the comments of cinema
studies students), availableathttp://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/decherneyupenn.
pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2007); Id. at 22-39 (listing the contents of the University of Pennsylvania
Cinema Studies library).
181. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68478.
182. Caitlyn Martin, A Fully Licensed, DMCA Compliant DVD Playerfor Linux, July 13,
2006, at http://www.oreilynet.com/linux/blog/2006/07/a-fullylicensed-dmca-compian.html.
183. The Truth about DVD CSS cracking by MoRE and [dEZZY/DoD], Nov. 4, 1999, at
http://www.free-dvd.org.lu/css-chain-of-events.txt.
184. Libdvdcss Changelog, available at http://www.videolan.org/developers/libdvdcss/
ChangeLog.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2007).
185. Libdvdcss Developer Documentation, at http://www.videolan.org/developers/libdvdcss/
doc/html/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2007) (explaining the operation of a software library that decrypts
CSS encoded DVDs by brute force); see About Xine, at http://xinehq.de/index.php/about (last
visited Aug. 21, 2007) (describing the varied uses of the Xine media player, which makes use of
libdvdcss).
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choose between foregoing watching DVDs using Linux or to unlawfully
circumventing CSS in order to make the otherwise lawful use.
III. PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL REFORM OF THE RULEMAKING
PROVISION SHOULD BE ADOPTED

The 1201 (a)(1)(C) "safety valve" has failed. Lawmakers incorporated
the provision to ensure that the distribution of TPM-encumbered
copyrighted works did not interfere with the ability of the public to make
otherwise lawful uses.'86 In light of the many and varied failures of the
rulemaking process and its demonstrated inability to avoid adverse effects
on noninfringing uses, congressional action to reform the process seems
appropriate. The structure of the rulemaking procedure itself impairs the
ability of the Copyright Office to effectuate the purpose, and the Copyright
Office's manner of implementation has exacerbated rather than alleviated
the harm. Furthermore, in the 2000 rulemaking the Office and the
participants immediately identified shortcomings in the guidance and
framework provided by the legislature. The sooner Congress addresses
these shortcomings, the sooner the intended protections for noninfringing
uses can be given effect.
A 2006 challenge to the constitutionality of the delegation makes
reform of the rulemaking scheme even more pressing. TracFone Wireless,
a company offering prepaid wireless telephone service, asserted in a
complaint in federal court that the delegation to the Copyright Office
violates the separation of powers.'87 TracFone sued the Librarian of
Congress and the Register of Copyrights over an exemption granted in
2006, which allows people to circumvent a TPM programmed into a
wireless phone in order to change service providers.'88 TracFone's
constitutional claim arises under the theory that the Library of Congress
is a part of the legislative rather than the executive branch, and so the
1201 (a)(1)(C) rulemaking constitutes an improper delegation of regulatory
authority.8 9 While some evidence exists to suggest this theory is

186. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 36 (1998).
187. Complaint at 11, Tracfone Wireless v. Billington, No. 06-22942 (S.D. Fla. 2006),
availableat http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/tracfone-v-billingtoncomplaint.pdf.
188. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68476.
189. Complaint at 11, Billington, No. 06-22942.
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mistaken,' 9" that did not prevent lawmakers from increasing their efforts
to reform the rulemaking proceeding in light of the constitutional
challenge.
Congressmen Rick Boucher of Virginia and John Doolittle of
California sought to amend the DMCA in at least three consecutive
sessions of Congress.' 9' These legislators took two different approaches to
the goal of reforming the rulemaking delegation, one indirect and the other
direct. In 2003 and 2005, Congressman Boucher introduced legislation
entitled the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act."9 The 2003 and 2005
Consumers' Rights Acts were substantially similar, though they contained
minor relevant differences. 93 Both would amend section 1201(c) to
include an express exemption to the circumvention ban "for purposes of
making noninfringing use of [a] work."' 9 4 Both bills died in committee. In

2007, Congressman Boucher introduced a radically different bill to address
the flaws in the rulemaking procedure.'95 Details on how the approaches
differ will be discussed below. Congressman Boucher's section-by-section
explanation of the FAIR USE Act identifies the TracFone challenge as a
new "compelling" reason to revisit the rulemaking and eliminate some of
the uncertainty it entails. 96
This part of this Article will evaluate the bills introduced by
Congressman Boucher in light of the flaws of the rulemaking proceeding
identified previously. While legislative realities may have prevented
Congressman Boucher's initial attempts at reform from succeeding, the
Digital Media Consumers' Rights Acts' approach can be instructive of the
possibilities for reform. Analysis of the older bills can also inform the
analysis of the sufficiency of the reform likely to result from the FAIR
USE Act should it succeed where the previous attempts failed.

190. Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 2281, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N.
671 (Nov. 2, 1998) (asserting that the Copyright Office is an executive branch agency).
191. Reps. Boucher and Doolittle Introduce the FAIR USE Act of 2007 (Feb. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter Boucher & Doolittle Press Release], available at http://www.boucher.house.gov/
index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id= 101 1&Itemid=75.
192. Cf H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003), with H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005).
193. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005).
194. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005).
195. H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007).
196. Congressman Rick Boucher, Section-by-Section Breakdown (Feb. 27, 2007), available
at http://www.boucher.house.gov/images/hr /o201201%20section%20by/o20section.doc.
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A. The DigitalMedia Consumers'RightsAct Would Remedy Most of
the Shortcomings of the Rulemaking Proceeding
Both versions of the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act contained
a section called "Fair Use Amendments.' 9 7 They would insert language
at the end of section 1201 (c) that created a broad fair use exemption to the
circumvention ban in section 1201(a). 9 8 The precise language used to
achieve this goal differed slightly: the 2003 bill would allow
circumvention when it "does not result in an infringement of the copyright
in the work,"' 99 while the 2005 bill would accomplish essentially the same
goal by tolerating circumvention undertaken "to obtain access to the work
for purposes of making noninfringing use of the work., 20 ' The latter
language appears to more closely reflect the language typically used to
petition for an exemption in the rulemaking proceeding, 20 ' but does not
appear to differ in substance. The amendment would create a broad general
exemption of the sort initially denied by the Copyright Office in 2000.202
This exemption would effectively obviate the need for the rulemaking
proceeding and nearly restore the balance of interests between copyright
holders and users to the status quo ante. Users would be permitted to
circumvent and make noninfringing uses without prospectively petitioning
for an exemption from the Copyright Office, and copyright holders would
have no legal remedy as to those users. However, the circumvention ban
would remain in place and would still provide a legal remedy for
circumvention that resulted in infringement. Thus, the amendment retains
the legal incentive to engage in self-help. The language would also not
impair the DMCA's conformity with the WIPO treaties, which
contemplate tolerating circumvention for uses "permitted by law." 203 Nor
would it constitute an "abrogation of section 1201 (a)(1)," as asserted by
the Copyright Office in its 2003 rulemaking, because circumvention would

197. H.R. 107 § 5, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1201 § 5, 109th Cong. (2005).
198. H.R. 107 § 5, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1201 § 5, 109th Cong. (2005).
199. H.R. 107 § 5(b)(l), 108th Cong. (2003).
200. H.R. 1201 § 5(b)(1), 109th Cong. (2005).
201. See, e.g., 2006 Final Rule, supranote 112, at 64572-73 (denying an exemption for "works
embodied in copies which have been lawfully acquired by users who subsequently seek to make
noninflinging use thereof').
202. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68472.
203. WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. 12

still be prohibited in cases where the user goes on to infringe the
copyright.2°
If this language was adopted, the greatest beneficiaries would be those
most harmed by the rulemaking proceeding: individual users of
copyrighted works. Given the procedural and substantive barriers to
individual users' ability to effectively organize and petition for
exemptions, a broad statutory exemption would be the most effective way
to protect their interest in making noninfringing uses. This amendment
would put in place just such a generally-applicable exemption.
The proposed amendment also would revise another pernicious aspect
of the DMCA which bans the manufacture and distribution of technology
that facilitates circumvention.20 5 As the DMCA currently exists, such
devices are not exempt even for the purposes of circumvention lawfully
conducted in accordance with an exemption issued by the Copyright
Office.20 6 Users must essentially "roll their own" method to circumvent,
leaving many without a legitimate means to exercise their right under the
exemption unless they are an engineer or computer programmer. 2 7 The
Consumers' Rights Acts would correct this defect and permit the
manufacture and distribution of technology that would enable
noninfringing uses. 208
These bills represented the most direct, effective means to overcome
the deficiencies in the rulemaking procedure. While the structure of the
rulemaking would remain in place, the broad exemption would eliminate
the harm. Individual users would not need to petition for and re-establish
exemptions every three years. The statutory exemption corrects the
imbalance that the regulatory regime created between the organized and
wealthy copyright holder interest groups and the largely unorganized and
resource-poor individual interests in private noninfringing uses. Moreover,
by removing the exemption from the discretion of the Copyright Office,
the Office could not perpetuate the substantive harm done to noninfringing
uses by its flawed implementation of the delegated authority. The
amendment would restore in Congress the authority to issue the general
exemption that the Office declined to exercise, and would firmly buttress

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at 62014.
H.R. 107 § 5(b)(2), 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1201 § 5(b)(2), 109th Cong. (2005).
Failing,supra note 130.
Id.
H.R. 107 § 5(b)(2), 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1201 § 5(b)(2), 109th Cong. (2005).
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the statutory language that the exemption proceedings were intended to
avoid harm to noninfringing uses.
Notwithstanding, the likely effectiveness of the Consumers' Rights
Acts in avoiding many of the harms caused by the rulemaking proceeding,
the bills never became law. Congressman Boucher explained that
"concerns expressed by content owners" inspired the new approach to the
problem embodied in the FAIR USE Act, 209 so it might be reasonable to
assume that those same concerns prevented the abandoned approach from
ever reaching a vote. Having enjoyed ongoing success in blocking or
narrowing most exemptions in the rulemaking venue,2 0 content owners
probably did not appreciate the legislative attempt to "circumvent" the
regulatory framework and establish a broad statutory exemption.
B. The FAIR USE Act as ProposedRemedies Only Some of the
Shortcomings of the Rulemaking Proceeding
Having been unsuccessful with the Consumers' Rights Acts in the
108th and 109th Congresses, Congressmen Boucher and Doolittle changed
their approach to reform of the anticircumvention rulemaking in the 110th
Congress. The FAIR USE Act reflects the concerns of content owners who
objected to the broad exemption contained in the earlier bills. The new
legislation addresses the rulemaking procedure in a more direct fashion
than the Consumers' Rights Acts did, though the FAIR USE Act's reforms
are more narrowly tailored and address the failings of the policy in a more
incremental fashion. Congressman Boucher "continue[s] to believe" the
law is in need of a broad statutory exemption of the sort featured in the
Consumers' Rights Acts, but hopes to implement reforms that "do not pose
a comparable potential threat to [content owners'] business models."2 1'
1. What the FAIR USE Act gets Right
The FAIR USE Act's direct approach deals with the rulemaking
procedure on its own terms. Rather than circumventing the procedure with
a broad exemption, the bill would codify the six exemptions issued by the
Copyright Office in 2006 with some minor modifications.2 1 2 To these
209. Boucher & Doolittle Press Release, supra note 191.
210. See 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112; 2003 Final Rule, supranote 92; 2006 Final Rule,
supra note 101.
211. 153 CONG. REC. E407-03 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2007) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
212. H.R. 1201 § 3(a), 110th Cong. (2007).
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exemptions, the bill would add six further exemptions which are narrower
than the general exemption contained in the Consumers' Rights Acts, but
were never granted by the Copyright Office. 213 Additionally, the legislation
would limit statutory damages for contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement and it would codify the Supreme Court's rule in Sony v.
Universal City Studios."4 That decision cleared hardware makers of
contributory and vicarious infringement liability when they produce a
staple article of commerce capable of substantial noninfringing uses.215
These reforms of the DMCA all would improve certainty for hardware
manufacturers and users, who would be able to rely on the continued
existence of certain exemptions to the circumvention ban.21 6 Codifying the
six 2006 exemptions would remove them from the discretion of the
Copyright Office, eliminating the possibility that they would expire. This
addresses one of the significant shortcomings of the rulemaking procedure,
but does not resolve it entirely. The triennial nature of the proceedings led
to outcomes that have harmed noninfringing uses through two
mechanisms.2" 7 First, previously granted exemptions were discontinued on
the basis of an unjustified burden of proof.218 Second, previously granted
exemptions were narrowed based on the identity of the party seeking the
exemption.219 Codifying the exemptions issued in the 2006 rulemaking will
undoubtedly avoid these undesirable outcomes for the six exemptions
contained in the statute, but would not in any way prevent the Copyright
Office from inflicting the same harms on future exemptions.
The FAIR USE Act provides added protection from this harm,
however, by codifying six more exemptions. 220 These exemptions reflect
a diverse collection of noninfringing uses were never wholly vindicated in
the rulemaking proceeding. The statute would expand the media studies
exemption to all classroom use.22' It would codify exemptions for a variety
of private noninfringing uses, allowing for more flexible home use of

213. H.R. 1201 § 3(b), 110th Cong. (2007).
214. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984);
2007 CONG. REc. E407-3 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2007) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
215. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.
216. See 153 CONG. REc. E407-03 (daily ed. Feb. 27,2007) (statement of Rep. Boucher); see
generally Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
217. See discussion supra Part II.B.
218. See discussion supra Part II.B.
219. See discussion supra Part II.B.
220. H.R. 1201 § 3(b), 110th Cong. (2007).
221. Id.
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DVDs and computer networks.222 The Act also contains a provision
allowing libraries and archives to preserve deteriorating works, and would
permit "circumvention that is carried out to gain access to a work of
substantial public interest solely for purposes
of criticism, comment, news
223
reporting, scholarship, or research.,

These exemptions remedy a variety of the shortcomings of the
1201(a)(1)(C) rulemaking proceeding. Under the Act, individuals could
engage in many of the private noninfringing uses of copyrighted works
heretofore forbidden by the circumvention ban. The Act would allow
petitioners like Tim Lee the ability to make certain private uses of CSSencoded DVDs which the Copyright Office refused to allow without
"guidance from Congress., 224 Thus, the additional statutory exemptions
would resolve questions left unanswered by Congress since the DMCA
took effect, and would avoid the structural hardships imposed by the
triennial rulemaking on individual users and uses.
The Act would also return a large portion of fair use to judicial
determination, re-establishing the traditional burdens of fair use. The
statutory exemption allowing circumvention of works "of substantial
public interest" for the traditional fair use purposes would remove the
presumption of illegitimacy that the DMCA imposed on these uses.2 25
Rather than needing to prospectively seek and justify an exemption every
three years, the courts would resume their role as the venue for
retrospectively evaluating the legitimacy of certain uses.
While this exemption would do the most to restore the availability of
fair use, it is not as remedial as the sweeping statutory exemption in the
Consumers' Rights Acts. Those acts provided a fair use defense to the
circumvention ban coextensive with traditional fair use.226 The FAIR USE
Act's exemption provides a similar, but qualified, right. In addition to
establishing that a use was fair, users would have to prove that the work
used was "a work of substantial public interest," a requirement not present
in the ordinary fair use analysis.227
The FAIR USE Act also addresses the Copyright Office's practice of
narrowing exemptions on the basis of the party seeking exemption under

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id.
2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64568.
Cf H.R. 1201 § 3(b), 110th Cong. (2007), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
H.R. 107 § 5(b)(1), 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1201 § 5(b)(l), 109th Cong. (2005).
Cf. H.R. 1201 § 3(b), 110th Cong. (2007), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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the new "class of works" rule. The Act would expand the media studies
exemption to reverse the effects of this practice and make the use available
to more users. 228 The Offices restricted the exemption to works "included
in the educational library of a college or university's film or media studies
department" and make the exemption only available to "media studies or
film professors., 229 As explained above, this rule prevented high school
teachers and non-traditional educators from making the same use for the
same purpose. 2 0 The exemption contained in the FAIR USE Act would
expand the exemption to allow for the use of "works in the collection 2of
31
a library or archives for educational use in a classroom by an instructor.,

This would certainly include high school teachers, and could even extend
its protection to non-traditional educators making use of their home
232

library.

Through this statutory exemption, the Act removes barriers imposed on
233
educators by the structure and implementation of the rulemaking.
Teachers seeking to make legitimate uses of copyrighted material who do
not possess the resources to prepare for and effectively participate in the
rulemaking every three years would likely continue to be shut out of
exemptions issued by the Copyright Office. Rather than tolerate the
ongoing harm to these noninfringing uses, a statutory remedy seems both
necessary and appropriate.
2. Where the FAIR USE Act Falls Short
The FAIR USE Act does not remove barriers to exemption seekers
universally. For example, it codifies the exemption for obsolete computer
software which was issued in 2003 and reissued in narrower form in
2006.234 The Copyright Office narrowed the exemption on the basis of the
identity of the party seeking the exemption, making the use available only

228. H.R. 1201 § 3(b), 110th Cong. (2007).
229. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68473-74.
230. See discussion supra Part II.D.
231. H.R. 1201 § 3(b), 110th Cong. (2007).
232. While use of a home library would be a close question under the language of the Act, the
use of materials in a public library would be more assuredly protected. The distinction would be
a matter left for judicial interpretation, and so would benefit from a clarification in the legislative
history.
233. See discussion supraPart II.A-B.
234. Cf. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68474, with 2003 Final Rule, supra note 92, at
62014.
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to "librar[ies] or archive[s]."235 Individual users who wished to circumvent
a TPM to access and make noninfringing private use of obsolete software
benefited from the participation of the Internet Archive (who obtained the
exemption) in 2003, but lost that benefit in 2006 to the new "class of
works" rule.236 The FAIR USE Act would cement that loss into the statute.
Because triennial rulemakings would continue under the Act,
individual users could seek to restore the software exemption for private
noninfringing uses, but they would face the same barriers that the process
always imposed, and one new barrier: the Copyright Office would likely
cite codification of the narrower rule as evidence of legislative intent that
the exemption's scope should not be expanded.237 Congressman Boucher's
introduction of the bill stated that enactment of the statutory exemptions
"is not intended and should not be construed as... limiting other rights of
... the DMCA... ,,238 which would include obtaining exemptions using
the ongoing rulemaking procedure. However, the Copyright Office has
demonstrated its preference for selectively using legislative history as
justification to deny exemptions even in light of evidence that conflicts
with their interpretation. 239 A more direct statement in the legislative
record on the intended effect of the statutory exemptions on future
exemptions would help avoid this outcome.
As Congress debates the propriety of any statutory exemptions, it must
take care to anticipate the effect of the debate on future rulemakings. The
Copyright Office used Congressional inaction as a reason to deny an
exemption in 2000.240 Removal or modification of statutory exemptions
contained in the FAIR USE Act or any future proposed legislation could
harm the ability of copyright users to obtain exemptions in future
rulemakings. Congress should consider providing unambiguous guidance
to the Office regarding the proper construction of congressional inaction
on contemplated statutory exemptions.
The most effective way to accomplish this would be to amend section
1201(a)(1)(C) to expressly exclude congressional inaction as a proper
235. 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101, at 68474.
236. See supra note 234.
237. The Copyright Office's propensity for citing legislative intent as justification for denying
exemptions is discussed sporadically throughout Part II of this Article. See also Herman & Gandy,
Jr., supra note 19, at 168-70.

238.
E407-03
239.
240.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); 153 CONG. REC.
(daily ed. Feb. 27, 2007) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64573.
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factor for consideration in the rulemaking process. This would most
accurately reflect the nature of the legislative process in this area of the
law, where inaction does not amount to implicit disapproval but the
inability to reach a necessary compromise. 241 The failure to reach such a
legislative compromise has no bearing on the actual effects of the
circumvention ban on noninfringing use. Nor is such failure pertinent to
the substantively relevant fair use factors specified in section
1201 (a)(1)(C)(i)-(v), upon which the Copyright Office is directed to focus
its attention.242 The Office has an affirmative duty to avoid adverse effects
on noninfringing uses notwithstanding the existence or lack of statutory
exemptions. Rather than risk continued and enhanced harm to
noninfringing uses on the inapposite basis of legislative inaction, Congress
should explicitly relieve the Office of its ability to consider laws that
Congress did not pass as a factor.
The FAIR USE Act, ultimately, provides targeted relief from the
inability of the rulemaking procedure to operate as a "safety valve" for
noninfringing uses. The bill addresses the Copyright Office's restrictive
implementation and alleviates the demands of the triennial proceeding by
providing statutory exemptions. However, because the Act does not go so
far as to completely obviate the rulemaking procedure, it leaves gaps
through which some noninfringing uses may still fall. The Act contains no
affirmative guidance for the future conduct of the rulemaking. Besides the
aforementioned risk of exemption, unfriendly interpretations of legislative
intent, the Act does nothing to remedy the conduct of the proceeding itself.
For example, while statutory exemptions cannot expire for reasons
unrelated to the circumstances that initially justified them, that likelihood
remains for future exemptions issued by the Copyright Office. The burden
of proof would remain on exemption proponents to rejustify existing
exemptions every three years. Effective legislative reform of the
proceedings, then, should include instructions to the Office to establish
burdens of proof capable of effectuating the underlying purpose of the
exemption proceeding.2 43 This would require shifting the burden to parties
241. See generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CoRNELL L. REv. 857 (1987) (discussing the role of compromise in drafting copyright legislation).
242. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C)(i)-(iv) (2006).
243. For more discussion of the ways in which the burdens of proof assigned by the Copyright
Office do not effectuate the purpose of the proceeding, see Failing,supra note 130, at 8. The
document, written before the 2006 rulemaking concluded, contains the EFF's criticisms of the
1201(a)(1) rulemaking procedure and suggested legislative reforms directed at "clarify[ing
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seeking to overturn an exemption to demonstrate that the exemption is no
longer justified.
Despite not fully remedying the flaws of the rulemaking procedure,
passage of the FAIR USE Act would significantly improve the situation,
and so it should be enacted. Legislative directions to clarify the purpose
and proper conduct of the rulemaking would be a useful addition to the
bill, but their significance is reduced in light of the usefulness of the
statutory exemptions the bill already contains. Ideally, guidance should be
added to protect future exemptions, but the absence of such guidance
should not impede passage of the bill. However, failure to enact legislation
like the FAIR USE Act or changing the exemptions it contains would
change that calculus. The pressing need for clear congressional guidance
would remain.
As the Electronic Frontier Foundation wrote concerning the
Consumers' Rights Act, "[t]he simplest solution is also the best one.",2"
The Consumers' Rights Acts would have provided a simple solution-a
generally-applicable statutory exemption for all noninfringing uses.245
However, because copyright legislation cannot become law without the
acquiescence of copyright holders,246 the FAIR USE Act represents the
best opportunity since the DMCA was enacted to achieve the bulk of the
necessary reform.247 The bill reflects compromise with copyright holders
while still substantially addressing the problems created by the rulemaking
process.248

IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR NON-LEGISLATIVE
REFORM AND CONCLUSION

While legislative solutions represent the most effective means to
remedy the problems created by Congress, alternative methods of reform
are available. Harms to noninfringing uses can be diminished through a
Congress's] instructions to the Copyright Office." Id. Many of their concerns are reflected in this
article. See discussion supra Part II.
244. Failing,supra note 130, at 8.
245. See discussion supra Part III.A.
246. See Bohannan,supranote 126, at 584 (The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act
"reflects ... virtually complete delegation of drafting authority to representatives of large and wellorganized industries that would benefit from the legislation.").
247. Indeed, any reform at all.
248. Boucher & Doolittle Press Release, supra note 191 (explaining that the FAIR USE Act
represents a new approach from the previous two bills to reflect content owner concerns).
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strategic approach to the rulemaking process itself, and through judicial
review. Though these methods of reform are less than optimal, the
uncertainty involved in waiting for overdue legislative reform would
suggest that exemption seekers would be best served by pursuing other
ways to avoid continued harm to noninfringing uses. This part will provide
a rough sketch of the two non-legislative options for improving the
rulemaking process.
A. More Effective Participationin the Rulemaking
The best hope for obtaining satisfactory protection for noninfringing
uses within the rulemaking process itself lies in cooperation among
exemption seekers. They should pool resources to more effectively
conduct the legal and empirical research necessary to present effective
petitions. The more effectively fair users can institutionalize the general
effort to obtain exemptions from the Copyright Office, the more successful
the efforts will be. Considering the likelihood of adequate legislative
reform or abandonment of the rulemaking process,2 49 delay in establishing
such an institution will only ensure continued harm to noninfringing uses.
A formal organization designed to advance the interests of noninfringing
users in the rulemaking process could also advance those same interests in
other fora, such as Congress or the judiciary.
Exemption seekers should not voluntarily assert narrower exemptions
than necessary. Because exemption seekers will generally be less able to
benefit from exemptions under the 2006 "class of works" rule, 5° they
should make an effort to present cases that justify exemptions for anyone
making a particular use. Arguments should define classes of works with
reference to a generally applicable noninfringing use-such as archival,
education or private use-but not to an intended class of users. The
"'
Copyright Office takes the petitioner's identity into account on its own,25
so asking for a narrowed exemption would not improve the changes of
obtaining the exemption. The only result would be to assure reduced utility
of the exemption to other users.
Lastly, exemption seekers should prevail on the Copyright Office to
reevaluate its standards and burdens of proof. Here, the triennial nature of
the proceedings can work to the advantage of exemption seekers, who

249. Not likely, judging by legislative inaction to date.
250. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
251. See id.
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have been on the losing side of these arguments in each of the past three
rulemakings but have made some progress since 2000.252 In particular,
exemption seekers defending existing exemptions should argue that once
an exemption is granted, it should be presumed justified and the burden
rests on parties seeking to overturn it. The Office's current practice
treating existing exemptions the same as requests for new exemptions
cannot be justified by the rationale underlying the rulemaking. 3
B. JudicialReview as a Last Resort
Obtaining reform from the Copyright Office would alleviate some of
the imbalance between copyright owners and fair users. Strategic attempts
to do so can also improve the possibility of obtaining reform from the
judicial branch. By coordinating resources and efforts in the rulemaking,
participants will be able to lay better groundwork for judicial review.
Because the DMCA grants broad discretion to the Copyright Office,254
few opportunities will present themselves for actionable review. The
rulemaking would largely be subject to review only to the extent the
outcome is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion" 251 and would
benefit from a "presumption of regularity., 256 The determinations issued
by the Office are extensively reasoned, usually providing multiple reasons
for every exemption granted or denied. 5 7 Even if a reason were to be
found improper, or if the Office ignored a relevant factor, the remedy
would likely be to vacate and remand the decision to the agency for a new
determination.258 Consequently, the courts do not present an effective
means to reverse unfavorable agency action except in the clearest cases.
However, many of the reasons provided by the Copyright Office have
been identified as specious in this article. 259 Exemption seekers should

252. See 2006 Final Rule, supranote 101, at 68473 (discussing the new "class ofworks" rule).
253. See discussion supra Part II.C.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
255. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
256. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (citing Pac. States
Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935)).
257. See, e.g., 2006 Final Rule, supra note 101.
258. 2 Admin. L. & Prac. § 8.31[l] (2d ed. 2007) ("Remand is the proper remedy where the
court doubts that the agency has properly exercised its discretion but recognizes that it is the agency
which should exercise that discretion and not the court.").
259. A generally-applicable exemption for all noninfringing uses would not constitute "an
administrative abrogation." See supratext accompanying note 204. The legislative history does not
support the "substantial adverse effects" standard of proof. See supra text accompanying notes
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remain vigilant and continue to challenge the Office to justify denials with
legitimate reasons, and force the office to abandon poor justifications. If
the Copyright Office continues to assert poor justifications to the detriment
of noninfringing uses, it could give rise to actionable arbitrariness.
However, given the expense of litigation and the dim prospect of success,
however, exemption seekers should focus their attention on the other two
modes of reform.
The need for legislative reform of the DMCA anticircumvention
rulemaking has been apparent since the first rulemaking.2 ° Calls for
reform and clarity continue to sound.26 1 Even, Bruce Lehman, a chief
architect of the DMCA and the WIPO treaties, conceded that things did
not turn out as intended.262 Congress should move to enact reform in order
to stave off further harm to noninfringing uses. While the Consumers'
Rights Acts would have resolved the matter entirely and restored the
balance between copyright holders and fair users, the need for compromise
led to the incremental reform of the FAIR USE Act.263 Because a
compromise reform is better than no reform at all, the FAIR USE Act
should become law. Whether or not legislative reform arrives, participants
seeking relief from the circumvention ban need to coordinate their efforts
to maximize the usefulness of their participation in future proceedings.
Through these avenues, fair use may yet survive the DMCA.

97-101. The Librarian was delegated the power to issue whatever exemptions it considers
appropriate. See supra text accompanying notes 140-52.
260. 2000 Final Rule, supra note 112, at 64568 (asking for Congress to clarify its intent).
261. See, e.g., Walter S. Mossberg, Congress Must Make Clear Copyright Laws to Protect
Consumers, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 22, 2007, http://ptech.wsj.com/archive/ptech20070322.html.
262. Michael Geist, DMCA ArchitectAcknowledges NeedforaNewApproach,Mar. 23, 2007,
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/1826/125.
263. See Reps. Boucher and Doolittle Introduce the FAIR USE Act of 2007 (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://www.boucher.house.gov/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=l 011 &Itemid=75
(explaining that the FAIR USE Act represents a new approach from the previous two bills to reflect
content owner concerns).

